The Future of RAB: Reform or Dissolution?

Since its establishment, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) has remained at the centre of sustained public debate in Bangladesh. Created as an elite force to combat serious crime, terrorism, and organized criminal networks, it has been credited by some for operational successes in suppressing violent criminality. At the same time, it has faced persistent allegations of human rights violations, including enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. Sanctions imposed by the United States Department of the Treasury and concerns raised by the United Nations Human Rights Council have significantly affected its domestic and international credibility. Consequently, public scrutiny has intensified, and calls for either its abolition or fundamental restructuring have gained momentum.

The debate has recently resurfaced with renewed intensity following testimony before the International Crimes Tribunal-1 by former Bangladesh Army Chief Iqbal Karim Bhuiyan. In his deposition, he called for the disbandment of both RAB and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), alleging institutional involvement in enforced disappearances and extrajudicial practices. He argued that prolonged engagement in unlawful operations had eroded professional standards, institutional morale, and public trust. According to his testimony, the secondment of junior army officers to RAB facilitated the normalization of practices such as so-called “crossfire” incidents and secret detention in facilities like “Aynaghar.” If these allegations are substantiated through a lawful and impartial investigation, they would give rise to serious concerns regarding legality, institutional integrity, and democratic accountability.

Similar conclusions were drawn by the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances formed by the interim government. Its interim and final findings alleged that enforced disappearances were not isolated irregularities but reflected systematic patterns involving multiple state security agencies, with RAB most frequently accused and DGFI also implicated in numerous cases. The Commission documented allegations of abductions carried out by individuals in plain clothes, misattribution of agency responsibility to evade scrutiny, and detention in undisclosed facilities where detainees were allegedly denied due process. The findings suggested a coordinated pattern that crossed constitutional mandates and blurred institutional boundaries. While these allegations require judicial determination through due process, they nevertheless demand serious institutional introspection. This essay, however, focuses specifically on RAB.

At the core of the reform debate lies a foundational democratic principle: the clear separation between civilian law enforcement and military functions. In a constitutional democracy, policing is inherently a civilian responsibility. It must operate under statutory authority, respect due process, apply proportionate force, and remain accountable to civilian courts. The armed forces, by contrast, are constitutionally structured to defend the state against external threats.

When military personnel become routinely embedded within civilian policing structures, the distinction between combat-oriented and law-enforcement-oriented cultures begins to blur. Exceptional operational methods risk becoming normalized, and the framework of civilian oversight may weaken. Democratic governance depends upon preserving institutional boundaries, because when emergency arrangements evolve into permanent structures, rule-of-law safeguards may erode gradually but decisively.

The Commission therefore recommended limiting military involvement in law enforcement to rare and clearly defined emergencies. Comparative democratic practice demonstrates that military aid to civil authorities is typically time-bound, formally authorized, and subject to parliamentary or judicial review. The threshold for such deployment must remain high. The recent deployment of armed forces following the political transition after the ouster of the Awami League government may be understood within a context of constitutional necessity; however, such measures must remain exceptional rather than institutionalized.

Within this wider debate, this New Age reported that the interim government had decided to rename RAB as the Special Intervention Force (SIF) instead of abolishing it. Critics argue that renaming alone cannot constitute reform. A new title or uniform does not alter command structures, accountability mechanisms, operational culture, or legal frameworks. Without structural transformation, transparent oversight, independent investigation of past abuses, and meaningful civilian control, cosmetic rebranding risks being perceived as image management rather than substantive change.

Conversely, some national and international human rights groups advocate outright dissolution. Yet dissolution alone does not resolve structural deficiencies. If RAB were dismantled without comprehensive reform, its functions, personnel networks, and operational culture could migrate to other institutions. Institutional habits rarely disappear; they relocate. The policy choice, therefore, should not be framed as a binary between preservation and abolition.

Bangladesh undeniably requires specialized capacity to address organized crime, terrorism, and transnational criminal networks. The critical question is not whether such capacity is necessary, but how it should be structured. Any specialized unit must operate strictly under civilian authority, within constitutional limits, and under transparent oversight. Only through principled restructuring, not symbolic gestures, can durable reform be achieved.

The General argued that if the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) cannot be dissolved, at the very least the longstanding practice of deputing armed forces personnel to it should be discontinued, an observation also reflected in the Commission’s report. This highlights a deeper tension within security sector governance. The routine secondment of military officers to civilian law enforcement bodies has produced a hybrid institutional model that sits uneasily within a democratic framework of accountability.

Military training emphasizes combat readiness and neutralization of threats. Democratic policing, however, prioritizes restraint, evidence-based investigation, procedural safeguards, and accountability to civil courts. When these professional cultures merge within a single organization, complications arise: dual chains of command, ambiguous loyalty structures, and blurred accountability.

Addressing this structural mismatch requires more than administrative adjustment. Reform should gradually phase out routine military secondment to civilian law enforcement replacing it with fully civilian recruitment, training, and career systems. Such a transition would clarify institutional identity, strengthen accountability mechanisms, and align operational practices with constitutional norms. By drawing a clear boundary between military and civilian roles, the state can preserve the professional integrity of the armed forces while fostering a law enforcement system that is coherent, transparent, and firmly anchored in democratic principles.

Institutional reform must be grounded in a well formulated recruitment framework. Under such a model, fresh recruitment should be conducted through a dedicated and transparent framework emphasizing integrity, psychological suitability, investigative aptitude, and demonstrated commitment to the rule of law. Screening mechanisms must assess not only tactical competence but also ethical orientation and respect for constitutional rights. By cultivating a professional identity rooted solely in civilian policing, the force can gradually disengage from doctrinal influences inconsistent with democratic accountability.

Reform must also encompass the training architecture. Comprehensive instruction in constitutional law, criminal procedure, forensic investigation, digital evidence management, human rights standards, and custodial safeguards should form the core of both induction and continuing professional development. Specialized modules addressing the prohibition of enforced disappearance, use-of-force standards, and command responsibility would further institutionalize legal compliance. Training should not be episodic but continuous, reinforcing evolving norms and best practices in democratic policing.

Moreover, a dedicated training institution should be established to provide structured and specialized training for new recruits. Until now, police officers assigned to RAB have largely been drawn from the existing pool of police personnel, individuals originally recruited, trained, and shaped under the colonial framework of the Police Act, 1861. This legacy model, rooted in a different historical and administrative context, underscores the need for a modernized training approach aligned with contemporary democratic norms, accountability standards, and human rights principles. The laws that govern special security forces must be clear and firmly based on the Constitution.

Structural reform cannot succeed without robust oversight. Independent review bodies—such as the proposed Police Commission under the Police Commission Ordinance, 2025—must be empowered with investigatory authority, access to classified information, subpoena power, and protection from executive interference. However, the constitution of this Commission under a retired judge remains pending, leaving a significant oversight gap.

Internal accountability systems must include transparent disciplinary procedures, mandatory reporting obligations, and whistleblower protections. Parliamentary committees and national human rights institutions should exercise active supervisory functions. Oversight serves both preventive and restorative purposes: preventing abuse and rebuilding public trust.

Accountability should focus on individuals, not on entire institutions. As the General rightly said, holding fair trials does not harm the honour of the army; it strengthens it. An institution protects its dignity not by hiding wrongdoing, but by showing, that no one is above the law. Research on transitional justice also shows that proper and credible prosecutions help prevent future abuses more effectively than blaming a whole organization. The aim is not to shame an entire force, but to uphold the rule of law. If any member of the police or the armed forces commits a wrong, that person alone should face trial through due process. The institution as a whole should not carry the blame for the actions of an individual.

Bangladesh now stands at what Bhuiyan described as a “rare opportunity for self-correction.” History suggests that moments of institutional introspection are fleeting. If reform is delayed, inertia and vested interests reassert themselves. Therefore, a sequenced roadmap is essential: immediate moratorium on military deputation to policing units; independent audit of past operations; victim-centered reparations mechanisms; legislative restructuring of special forces; and establishment of a permanent, constitutionally protected oversight commission.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) refers to a comprehensive process of transforming all security institutions to enhance accountability, effectiveness, and compliance with human rights and the rule of law. In the context of Bangladesh, SSR must be firmly grounded in constitutional principles, particularly the supremacy of the Constitution under Article 7, equality before the law under Article 27, the protection of fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 31–35, and the principle of civilian authority over executive functions reflected in Articles 55 and 65. Conceptually, SSR in Bangladesh should therefore be understood not as a narrow technical exercise confined to capacity enhancement, but as a broader governance agenda embedded within the constitutional framework. It encompasses democratic oversight by Parliament, the judiciary, and independent constitutional bodies, while also recognizing the constructive role of civil society and the media in promoting transparency and accountability. Ultimately, a constitutionally anchored SSR process seeks to ensure that security provision remains effective, lawful, and people-centred, thereby strengthening democratic governance, reinforcing public confidence in state institutions, and contributing to sustainable national security.

In this context, security sector reform should be institutionalized through the creation of a Permanent Security Sector Reform Commission like the Judicial Reform Commission to ensure continuous, structured, and accountable oversight of the country’s security architecture. Rather than relying on ad hoc commissions formed after crises, a standing, independent body would regularly review laws, operational practices, use-of-force policies, recruitment and training standards, and compliance with constitutional and human rights obligations. Such a commission would safeguard the civilian character of policing, monitor the boundary between military and civilian roles, strengthen internal and external accountability mechanisms, and provide expert advice on legislative and policy reforms. By embedding reform as an ongoing process rather than a reactive measure, the commission would enhance professionalism, prevent institutional drift or politicization, and build sustainable public trust in security institutions while reinforcing democratic governance and the rule of law.

The debate over the future of RAB is ultimately not about renaming or abolishing a single force, but about strengthening Bangladesh’s commitment to constitutional governance, accountability, and democratic policing. While the country undeniably needs specialized capacity to combat terrorism and organized crime, security must operate within clear civilian control, legal safeguards, and transparent oversight. Cosmetic changes will not restore public trust; meaningful reform requires ending routine military secondment to civilian law enforcement, building a fully civilian professional structure, ensuring independent investigations of alleged abuses, and institutionalizing permanent oversight mechanisms. Accountability should focus on individual responsibility through due process rather than collective blame, thereby preserving institutional dignity while upholding the rule of law. In the long run, sustainable national security depends not only on operational strength but also on justice, transparency, and public confidence in state institutions.

Dr. Md. Motiar Rahman, ndc