Middlemen-Free Police Stations in Bangladesh

The recent directive reported in the print and social media, where the Home Minister called for “middlemen-free” police stations, reflects a significant policy signal within the broader framework of governance reform and police accountability in Bangladesh. This initiative, though administrative in appearance, carries deeper structural and normative implications for policing culture, institutional integrity, and state–citizen relations.

At a fundamental level, the directive addresses the entrenched phenomenon of informal intermediaries commonly referred to as brokers or “dalals” who operate within or around police stations. These actors often facilitate access to services such as filing, recording First Information Reports (FIRs), or influencing investigative processes. Their presence reflects a dual system of governance, where formal procedures coexist with informal practices. From a theoretical standpoint, this aligns with the concept of “informal institutions” that emerge to compensate for inefficiencies, opacity, or perceived inaccessibility in formal bureaucratic systems.

The call to eliminate middlemen should therefore be understood primarily as an anti-corruption intervention. Middlemen tend to flourish in administrative environments marked by excessive discretion, poor responsiveness, limited transparency, and weak accountability. Moreover, when officers remain inaccessible to service seekers, or when citizens cannot approach them without navigating rigid bureaucratic protocols, opportunities are created for third-party intervention. Removing such intermediaries is intended to disrupt rent-seeking networks and reduce the informal costs imposed on citizens seeking police services. This approach is consistent with broader anti-corruption frameworks, which emphasize procedural simplification, direct service delivery, and the reduction of unnecessary human intermediaries as essential strategies for improving governance outcomes.

The use of informal “sources” by Sub-Inspectors at police stations in Bangladesh may, at times, serve certain operational purposes, such as intelligence gathering, locating suspects, apprehending offenders, and assisting in the detection and investigation of criminal cases. These individuals often develop close associations with police officers, particularly Sub-Inspectors, and gain relatively easy access to the police establishment.

Over time, however, some of these sources tend to position themselves as intermediaries between the police and ordinary citizens. In many cases, they exploit their proximity to police personnel to influence communication and access to services, thereby creating an informal barrier between the police and the public. As these intermediaries gradually assume the role of gatekeepers, direct public access to police services may become restricted, sometimes giving rise to favouritism, manipulation, or exploitation.

Such practices undermine transparency, equality in service delivery, and public confidence in policing institutions, while also revealing deeper structural and administrative weaknesses within police service delivery mechanisms. In many developing countries, the widespread reliance on intermediaries or brokers to access police services has historically created significant barriers, particularly for marginalized and vulnerable sections of society. Against this backdrop, the directive of the Minister reflects an important shift toward citizen-centric policing, a model that emphasizes accessibility, responsiveness, accountability, and fairness in the delivery of police services. By encouraging direct interaction between police officers and citizens, the policy seeks to eliminate the informal gatekeeping role of brokers and unofficial intermediaries, democratize access to justice, and reinforce the principle that law enforcement agencies are public service institutions accountable to the people rather than exclusive custodians of authority. This approach also highlights the broader need for institutional reforms to strengthen transparency, enhance public trust, and ensure that citizens can obtain police assistance directly, efficiently, and without fear of exploitation or discrimination.

Another critical theme emerging from this directive is the emphasis on professionalism and ethical conduct within the police force. The minister’s call for honesty, sincerity, and fairness reflects an attempt to reshape organizational culture. This is particularly relevant in post-colonial policing systems, where hierarchical authority and discretionary power have often overshadowed service orientation. The directive implicitly advocates for a transition from personality-driven or influence-based policing to rule-based and procedurally just policing, consistent with international standards of democratic law enforcement.

The visit to Ramna Police Station offers a welcome and timely insight—one that has the potential to resonate across police stations throughout Bangladesh. It highlights both the promise of reform and the persistence of structural and behavioral challenges that continue to affect service delivery at the station level.

A single minister cannot realistically visit and monitor every police station, nor is such direct oversight institutionally expected in a modern administrative system. What is essential, however, is the establishment of a robust, institutionalized oversight mechanism to ensure that police services are delivered in accordance with the lawful expectations and needs of service seekers. This calls for a system grounded in clear service delivery standards, regular monitoring and evaluation, and effective accountability frameworks. While a minister’s direct inspection of a police station and engagement with officers reflects an important form of executive oversight aimed at ensuring compliance with policy directives, such efforts must be sustained through institutional arrangements rather than personal intervention. A combination of supervisory hierarchies, digital tracking systems, performance evaluations, citizen feedback mechanisms, and independent oversight bodies can collectively ensure that policing remains responsive, transparent, and aligned with the rule of law.

Equally important is the question of professional responsiveness, an essential pillar of public trust in policing. The conduct of key personnel, especially the Officer-in-Charge (OC) and the duty officer, appears at times inconsistent with the standards expected of public servants entrusted with law enforcement responsibilities. Responsiveness is not merely a procedural obligation; it is a reflection of institutional culture, responsibility and accountability.

The challenge extends further into the domain of communication. In an era where digital connectivity is expected to enhance accessibility, reaching police officers even via mobile phone remains difficult. A telling example comes from a retired police officer who recounted his unsuccessful attempts to contact the OC of a rural police station. Despite repeated calls, there was no response. Even when the call was eventually answered, no voice came from the other end, and no further communication followed, as there was no call back. . While this incident pertains to a rural context, it raises legitimate concerns about accessibility in busier and more prominent stations such as Ramna.

There is also a perceptible tendency among some officers to prioritize calls from known or influential individuals, inadvertently marginalizing ordinary citizens. This selective responsiveness not only weakens public confidence but also contradicts the principles of equitable service delivery.

Taken together, these observations point to a broader need for institutional reform—one that goes beyond infrastructure and addresses attitudes, accountability, and accessibility. A police station must not only function efficiently but also embody the values of openness, fairness, and service to all citizens, irrespective of status or connection.

A further dimension of the directive is its attempt to dismantle informal power networks embedded within policing environments. Middlemen often operate with tacit support from segments of the police or local elites, forming part of a broader ecosystem of patronage and influence. Eliminating these actors is therefore not merely an administrative task but a sensitive reform, as it challenges vested interests and entrenched practices. Success in this regard will depend on the state’s ability to enforce discipline, protect whistleblowers, and sustain political will.

Importantly, the directive also carries implications for public trust and institutional legitimacy. The reliance on intermediaries has long undermined confidence in police institutions, fostering perceptions of corruption and bias. By promoting direct, transparent interactions, the reform seeks to rebuild trust and enhance the legitimacy of law enforcement agencies. In policing theory, legitimacy is a cornerstone of effective law enforcement, as it influences public cooperation, compliance with the law, and overall social stability.

At a fundamental level, infrastructure remains a critical concern. Ramna Police Station, being housed in a rented building, reflects a broader systemic issue. Such arrangements are often ill-suited to the functional and security requirements of a modern police station. Beyond operational limitations, the absence of purpose-built facilities undermines the ability to create a citizen-friendly environment. Service seekers, in particular, require designated, accessible, and dignified spaces where they can communicate their concerns without discomfort or intimidation. There are many police stations operating in a rented house.

From a broader policy perspective, this initiative can be situated within ongoing debates on police reform in Bangladesh, including issues of  modernization, and service delivery improvement. While the removal of middlemen is a necessary step, it is not sufficient in isolation. Sustainable reform will require complementary measures such as digitization of police services, capacity building, procedural simplification, delegation of financial power to OC with pragmatic budget and logistics and legal safeguards against abuse of power.

In recent years, reform efforts within the Bangladesh Police have increasingly focused on digitalization and service innovation as strategic tools to curb the influence of informal intermediaries and enhance institutional transparency. The introduction of online General Diary (GD) filing, digital police clearance services, and citizen-oriented mobile applications such as 999 or “Hello CT”, a digital reporting tools under Bangladesh Police reflects a shift toward technology-driven governance. These initiatives are designed to create direct, traceable interfaces between citizens and the police, thereby minimizing opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour and discretionary manipulation by middlemen.

From a service delivery perspective, such reforms align with broader global trends in e-governance, where efficiency, accessibility, and accountability are prioritized. By reducing face-to-face interactions in routine services, digital platforms help standardize procedures and ensure greater consistency in decision-making. However, the transition is not without structural and socio-cultural constraints. Limited digital literacy among segments of the population, particularly in rural and marginalized communities, restricts the inclusivity of these services. At the same time, resistance from entrenched interests, both within and outside the institutional framework, can impede effective implementation. Uneven access to digital infrastructure, including internet connectivity and smart devices, further compounds these challenges, creating a risk of a new form of exclusion even as older barriers are dismantled.

Parallel to technological reforms, the expansion of community policing in Bangladesh represents a normative and participatory approach to reducing reliance on informal intermediaries. This model seeks to reconfigure the relationship between law enforcement agencies and the public by fostering collaboration, mutual trust, and shared responsibility for maintaining law and order. Rather than relying on brokers or influential individuals to mediate access to police services, community policing emphasizes structured engagement through community forums, liaison committees, and neighbourhood-based initiatives.

At its core, this approach promotes localized problem-solving, where police officers and community members jointly identify and address security concerns. Such engagement not only enhances the legitimacy of the police but also improves the flow of information, enabling more responsive and context-sensitive policing. Trust-building measures such as regular meetings, outreach programs, and citizen feedback mechanisms serve to institutionalize transparency and accountability and bridge the gap between police and the citizen.

However, the effectiveness of community policing depends on sustained commitment, adequate training, and organizational support. Without these, there is a risk that community structures may themselves be captured by local elites or informal power brokers, thereby reproducing the very mediation they are intended to eliminate. Therefore, for community policing to function as a genuine alternative, it must be embedded within a broader framework of democratic governance, oversight, and continuous evaluation.

In conclusion, the directive to establish middlemen-free police stations represents more than a routine administrative order; it is a symbolic and practical intervention aimed at transforming the nature of policing in Bangladesh. Thematically, it integrates concerns of anti-corruption, governance reform, professional ethics, and citizen engagement. Its success, however, will depend on the extent to which it is embedded within a comprehensive and sustained reform agenda that addresses both the structural and cultural dimensions of policing.

Md. Motiar Rahman