Police Corruption in Bangladesh

Corruption in Bangladesh is deeply rooted, affecting nearly every sector, including law enforcement. Police corruption, marked by bribery, abuse of power, political interference, and extortion, has eroded public trust, weakened the justice system, and fostered a culture of impunity. This not only hampers law enforcement but also obstructs justice, fuels social injustice, and strengthens criminal networks. Without meaningful reforms, stricter accountability, and ethical governance, the police force will remain inefficient and distrusted, undermining efforts to uphold the rule of law and maintain social stability.

Although corruption is widespread across all sectors in Bangladesh, the public still expects the police to remain steadfast guardians of integrity. Former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina once revealed that even a peon (a low-ranking staff member in the Prime Minister’s Office) had amassed an astonishing fortune of 400 crore taka—an alarming revelation. While corruption is widely acknowledged, people may not be overly concerned about the immense wealth accumulated by the peon. However, the public holds justifiable expectations that those entrusted with upholding the law, as its enforcers and guardians, must embody unwavering honesty. Police officers must not only practice integrity but also cultivate trust by being perceived as honest. They should remain accountable to multiple bodies and the people, exemplifying the principles of justice and morality they are sworn to protect.

The Police Reform Commission, established under the interim government, submitted a report on police reforms in Bangladesh. One chapter of the report addresses police corruption, drawing data from Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) reports on corruption in the country. It acknowledges that police corruption in Bangladesh is deeply entrenched, manifesting in bribery, abuse of power, extortion, and collusion with criminals. A national survey conducted by TIB identified the police as one of the most corrupt institutions in the country, with its 2022 report revealing that 74.4% of law enforcement service recipients had encountered corruption. The most corruption-prone areas include arrests (92.8%), traffic-related issues (90.6%), passport verification and police clearance processes (84.4%), FIRs and case-related matters (80%), general diary entries (58.7%), and investigations (55.8%). The TIB’s figures highlight corruption within the police force’s institutional activities, unethical practices extend beyond its direct jurisdiction.

The Police Reform Commission’s report identifies nine sectors of police corruption, five within institutional police activities and four beyond internal police institutions. Bribery and financial misconduct are the most common, with citizens often paying bribes at various stages of legal proceedings. Extortion through threats and torture of detainees in custody is widespread, particularly during remand. Recruitment and transfer trades involve significant bribery, with rumors of high payments for police positions. The misuse of power includes false arrests for extortion, while traffic police corruption is also prevalent. Beyond institutional misconduct, corruption extends to road and highway extortion, control over illegal street vending, and collusion with criminals, including involvement in illicit drug trade, human trafficking, and illegal arms smuggling. Some officers detain individuals for ransom, with enforced disappearances and illegal house raids linked to such practices.

The Police Reform Commission conducted a public opinion survey titled “What kind of police do we want?”,” found that 84% of respondents advocated that they want police free from corruption and unethical practices. The Police Reform Commission could conduct an independent opinion survey, similar to the one by Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), to assess the types and patterns of corruption within the police department. Such a survey would provide first-hand data, offering a more comprehensive understanding of systemic corruption rather than solely relying on the TIB report. While the TIB’s findings are valuable, corroborating them with an additional survey would enhance credibility, ensure a more nuanced perspective, and allow for the identification of new trends or overlooked issues. During the peak of kleptocratic state authoritarianism in Bangladesh, corruption was not only permitted but systematically encouraged and shielded through political and governance structures. Public sector corruption, particularly in public procurement and project execution, worsened as key institutions responsible for combating corruption—such as the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), law enforcement agencies, and the judiciary—were politicized and rendered ineffective.

Moreover, the survey could show clearly that police officers who are associated with all these services are involved in corruption. However, the vast majority of the force has limited or no involvement in such practices. This approach would also help policymakers and law enforcement agencies design more effective, evidence-based reforms to combat corruption and improve accountability within the police force.

The reform commission proposes an “All-Party Committee” and a Special Task Force to enhance transparency and combat police corruption. However, these measures face challenges such as politicization, conflicts of interest, and undue influence over law enforcement. Ensuring neutrality in a politically charged environment would be difficult.

While a Special Task Force could enforce accountability, its success depends on political will, independence, and a strong legal mandate. Effective anti-corruption efforts require institutional reforms, strict enforcement mechanisms, and whistleblower protection, rather than relying solely on external committees. Transparency, non-partisanship, and strong legal backing are essential for meaningful reform.

The report highlights the presence of bribery in the recruitment process, particularly in the selection of Constables and Sub-Inspectors/Sergeants. While Bangladesh police asserts that they have implemented digital recruitment platforms featuring transparent selection criteria, automated screening, and standardized evaluations to minimize human interference and manipulation, political influence persists just before the viva voce stage. The reform commission failed to detect this subtle political intervention. Additionally, the recruitment board for Sub-Inspectors and Sergeants includes senior officials from the Ministry of Home Affairs.

In Bangladesh, the practice of police officers paying bribes for desirable postings and transfers is an open secret, deeply embedded in the bureaucratic and political landscape. Officers at various levels, from constables to high-ranking officials, often engage in unofficial financial transactions or leverage political connections to secure postings in lucrative or strategically advantageous locations. These sought-after positions, typically in urban areas or regions with significant commercial activity, provide opportunities for career advancement, financial benefits, or enhanced influence. This corrupt system is fuelled by a network of intermediaries, including senior officials, politicians, and brokers, who facilitate these transactions in exchange for monetary gains or reciprocal favours.

Similarly, the lack of a merit-based promotion system within the police force fosters a culture of corruption, as officers who secure promotions through bribery or political influence often feel compelled to recover their financial investments through illicit means. Instead of being rewarded for competence, integrity, and service, promotions frequently depend on personal connections, lobbying, and the ability to pay substantial sums to influential figures within the administration or political circles. Corruption demoralizes honest officers and creates a vicious cycle, where higher-ranking officials resort to extortion and bribery to sustain their power. This leads to institutionalized corruption, weakening accountability and public trust in law enforcement. The system discourages professionalism and ethics, ultimately compromising the police force’s effectiveness and credibility in maintaining law and order.

The reform commission fails to recommend replacing the politicized and bribe-driven hiring system with an independent and transparent recruitment authority within its recruitment structure. Notably, its proposals do not include the establishment of an independent Police Service Commission to oversee hiring and promotions, nor do they advocate for a performance-based evaluation system to reduce officers’ reliance on bribery for career advancement. To address these critical issues, a fully autonomous Police Service Commission should be created to ensure that recruitment and promotions are based on merit rather than financial transactions or political influence. Furthermore, implementing a performance-based promotion system would incentivize professionalism, integrity, and accountability within the force. By integrating these reforms, law enforcement agencies could foster a fairer and more transparent system, ultimately restoring public trust and enhancing overall efficiency in maintaining law and order.

The report did not address the issues of posting, transfer, and promotion at mid-level and senior ranks done by the ministries. In practice, officers must demonstrate allegiance to the ruling political government, with their backgrounds vetted to ensure alignment with the party in power. Those who fail to meet these expectations are often relegated to less significant roles, hindering their career progression. Additionally, some officers secure promotions, postings, and transfers through financial transactions. In such cases, Police Headquarters (PHQ) functions merely as a conduit, forwarding proposals to the relevant ministry. These proposals then navigate an extensive bureaucratic process before receiving the highly sought-after endorsement: “By the order of the Honourable President,” ostensibly for the sake of public interest. The file then makes its way back through the ministry in a similar manner for the issuance of the Government Order (GO).

The exchange—whether in cash or kind—takes place either at the beginning or the end of the deal.  A portion of the funds that remain in Bangladesh is legitimized as white money by the end of the financial year, allowing for legal investment in various sectors to generate surplus value.

The remaining portion moves through various channels before ultimately being loaded onto the digital minstrel, Skylark. It then ascends higher and higher, never looking back, eventually crossing Bangladesh’s borders and reaching its final destinations—Begum Para in Canada, the USA, Australia, Dubai, Malaysia’s Second Home program, and even India.

Within the ministry, officials serve as both facilitators and beneficiaries of these transactions, acting as honest brokers in a well-entrenched nexus between civil bureaucrats and politicians. The commission, however, failed to unravel this intricate web of corruption.

The Commission acknowledges political influence as a key factor in police corruption but fails to propose strong safeguards against political pressure. Politically motivated appointments prioritize loyalty over merit, fostering corrupt alliances and undermining impartial law enforcement. The report lacks recommendations for a depoliticized appointment process to ensure professionalism and integrity in leadership.

Additionally, the police are often used for political repression, including arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, and suppression of opposition activists. Despite recognizing these issues, the report does not suggest legal safeguards to prevent such abuses. The lack of operational independence leaves the police vulnerable to external manipulation, allowing crimes by ruling party affiliates to go unchecked. Without clear autonomy mechanisms, public trust and law enforcement integrity remain compromised.

An effective solution to safeguard police operations from political influence is the establishment of a legally mandated independent police authority, ensuring impartiality and professionalism. Criminalizing the political misuse of law enforcement and enforcing accountability would deter partisan manipulation. Additionally, parliamentary oversight through an independent committee could enhance transparency and maintain law enforcement’s focus on justice and public service. While police oversight is crucial for monitoring corruption, the Police Reform Commission failed to strongly advocate for it, with only a student representative pushing for an independent Police Commission. Bangladesh Police Headquarters supported a framework aligned with the 2007 Draft Police Ordinance, but the Ministry of Home Affairs opposed it, highlighting conflicting views. Despite unanimous endorsement of an oversight body, the Commission avoided taking a firm stance on whether it should be statutory or constitutional, seemingly delaying action due to political complexities and resistance. Furthermore, the report overlooks the implementation of technology dashboard cameras, or GPS tracking, which could enhance transparency and prevent the abuse of power.

The report highlights custodial torture as a tool for extortion but lacks strong legal proposals to criminalize it. Illegal detentions persist due to weak penalties, allowing police to demand bribes without fear of consequences. It also fails to address extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, often used for ransom, later disguised as “encounters” without independent verification. The absence of forensic oversight and weak accountability mechanisms protect corrupt officers.

To combat these abuses, strict legal penalties, an independent judiciary, and witness protection are necessary. Establishing independent forensic oversight units and mandatory digital recording in interrogation rooms can enhance transparency. However, success depends on political will, institutional independence, and a cultural shift within law enforcement to uphold accountability and human rights.

The report acknowledges widespread bribery and financial corruption in the police force but lacks concrete measures to prevent illicit wealth accumulation. It fails to mandate asset disclosure, allowing corrupt officers to hide unexplained wealth and evade accountability. The absence of stringent financial oversight further enables misconduct, eroding public trust.

Additionally, the report overlooks procurement fraud, where corruption inflates costs for essential resources due to the lack of an e-procurement system. Traffic police bribery, affecting 90.6% of cases, remains inadequately addressed, missing solutions like cashless fine collection and AI-driven surveillance to reduce officer-motorist interactions.

Even where the Commission puts forward some recommendations, its failure to establish a clear timeline for implementation significantly undermines their potential impact. Without defined deadlines, proposed reforms can be indefinitely delayed or entirely ignored, allowing corruption to persist unchecked. A well-structured reform process requires phased implementation with measurable milestones, yet the report lacks any such roadmap. This omission makes it easier for authorities to evade responsibility and for corrupt practices to continue without meaningful intervention. In the absence of a concrete action plan, even the most well-intentioned recommendations risk becoming empty promises rather than enforceable policies.

Additionally, the report does not address the critical issue of funding for anti-corruption initiatives, or over sight by the Anti-Corruption Commission with leaving doubts about how proposed measures will be financially sustained. Meaningful reforms, such as improved oversight mechanisms and technological interventions, require dedicated financial resources, yet the report fails to outline how such efforts will be financed. Furthermore, tackling police corruption demands a coordinated effort involving law enforcement agencies, the judiciary, the Anti-Corruption Commission, and civil society. However, the report does not propose any framework for inter-agency collaboration, leaving reform efforts fragmented and ineffective. Without financial backing and a structured approach to coordination, the Commission’s recommendations remain largely aspirational rather than actionable solutions to police corruption.

The Police Reform Commission’s report provides a sketchy analysis of corruption within the Bangladesh police, but its recommendations lack depth, structural solutions, and robust enforcement strategies. To effectively combat corruption, Bangladesh must adopt a multi-pronged approach that includes independent oversight bodies to investigate police misconduct, a depoliticized Police Service Commission to regulate hiring, transfers, and promotions, and harsh penalties for custodial torture, bribery, and procurement fraud. Additionally, mandatory digital transparency tools such as body cameras and online complaint systems should be implemented, along with a clear and time-bound strategy for enforcement. Without these comprehensive measures, police corruption will continue to erode public trust, undermine justice, and perpetuate systemic impunity in Bangladesh.

Dr Md Motiar Rahman, ndc